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Abstract. The problem of obfuscating the authorship of a text doc-
ument has received little attention in the literature to date. Current
approaches are ad-hoc and rely on assumptions about an adversary’s
auxiliary knowledge which makes it difficult to reason about the privacy
properties of these methods. Differential privacy is a well-known and
robust privacy approach, but its reliance on the notion of adjacency be-
tween datasets has prevented its application to text document privacy.
However, generalised differential privacy permits the application of dif-
ferential privacy to arbitrary datasets endowed with a metric and has
been demonstrated on problems involving the release of individual data
points. In this paper we show how to apply generalised differential pri-
vacy to author obfuscation by utilising existing tools and methods from
the stylometry and natural language processing literature.
Keywords: generalised differential privacy, author obfuscation, word
mover’s distance
1 Introduction
The proliferation of machine learning techniques and publicly available datasets
has resulted in some exciting advances in data analytics. At the same time,
some well-publicised privacy breaches, notably the AOL and Netflix examples,
have created concerns about data privacy and the ability for privacy methods
to protect against machine learning attacks. Differential privacy is a key privacy
definition which has rapidly gained popularity due to its mathematical founda-
tions and, importantly, its independence from assumptions about the external
data sources available to adversaries. This makes it an important tool for pro-
tection of personal data in the face of machine learning adversaries trained on
large-scale datasets.
Differential privacy relies on a notion of an ‘individual’ in a dataset, under the
assumption that datasets are structured into rows of individuals, and adversaries
are agents which query the data for statistical information. These notions are
not naturally transferable to unstructured datasets such as text documents.
Generalised differential privacy is an extension of differential privacy which
can be applied to arbitrary datasets endowed with a metric. This permits its
application to more general datasets, and has found most application in geo-
location privacy, involving the differentially private release of users’
2We recall the usual definition of differential privacy which says that, for any
pair of adjacent datasets x, x′ and some output z from a query, a (probabilistic)
mechanism K satisfies ǫ-differential privacy if
K(x)(z) ≤ eǫK(x′)(z)
for some non-negative ǫ. 1
Generalised differential privacy extends this notion to domains endowed with
a metric as follows: for any domain of secrets X endowed with a metric dX and
any elements x, x′ ∈ X , a (probabilistic) mechanism K satisfies ǫdX -privacy if
K(x)(z) ≤ eǫdX (x,x′)K(x′)(z)
In this paper we show how generalised differential privacy can be applied to
author obfuscation. This task requires the private release of documents so as to
protect the identity of the author whilst maintaining some semantic properties
of the document. We draw on existing notions of authorship from the stylometry
and natural language processing literature which incorporate the use of distance
measures between authors.
2 Problem Description
Author obfuscation is the task of obscuring a piece of text in order to hide its
authorship whilst preserving its semantic content. Stylometric techniques have
identified three types of features used to identify authorship of a document:
stylistic, word-based and character-based features. Stylistic features are typi-
cally lexical, syntactic or document-level characteristics. For example, average
word length, average sentence length and frequency of use of particular words
are all features which can be unique for authors. Word-based methods treat each
word in the document as a feature, and represent a document as a bag of words,
which ignores word ordering but preserves frequency counts of individual words.
Finally, character-based features treat individual sequences of characters as fea-
tures for document representation. These sequences are referred to as character
n-grams. For example, the character 3-gram representation of the phrase ”There
it is” would be ‘The’, ‘her’, ‘ere’, ‘re ’, ‘e it’, ‘it ’, ‘t i’, ‘ is’ 2.
2.1 Model
We envisage an author who wishes to release a document which preserves the
topicality of the original document whilst masking stylometric features which
may reveal their authorship. By ’topicality’ we refer to the ability of a document
consumer to identify the original topic of the document. In order to provide a
1 We use only the strict {ǫ, 0} version of differential privacy in this paper, and not its
relaxation (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
2 Note that we use ‘ ’ to represent spaces.
3privacy guarantee for any adversary (ie over any prior), we will use generalised
differential privacy. Our privacy promise is that the output document is almost
the same, regardless of whether the input document was x or some ’close’ doc-
ument x′, where closeness is defined using an appropriate metric distance. In
order to achieve privacy over authors, we need to modify the features in the
document which reveal authorship. This can be done firstly by considering doc-
uments formatted as bags of words (BOW). Such document are useful for ma-
chine learning applications, which typically use BOW formats and ignore word
ordering. This formatting also removes word ordering information, which reveals
important stylistic information. Secondly, we can remove ‘stopwords’, which are
words such as pronouns and prepositions, which do not contribute to the mean-
ing of the document. These have been shown to be highly effective in author
attribution, but because they contribute nothing to our utility requirement they
can be safely discarded. Finally, we can consider the removal of words which do
not significantly contribute to the topicality of the document, so as to reduce
the document down to the smallest set of words which guarantee some useful-
ness. This can be done using a feature classifier to identifier the most significant
features for topic classification.
2.2 Application of Differential Privacy
We can represent words as real-valued vectors using a word embedding repre-
sentation such as Word2Vec or GloVe. These representations preserve semantic
relationships between words, where the semantic distance is typically measured
using either cosine similarity or Euclidean distance. This also allows the entire
word embedding vocabulary to also be treated as a synonym set for any word
in the vocabulary. A natural metric to then consider for measuring the seman-
tic distance between documents is the Word Mover’s Distance. This metric has
been designed specifically for use with word embedding vectors, and is based on
the well-known Earth Mover’s Distance. Briefly, the Word Mover’s Distance is
the cost of moving all the words from one document to the words in another
document. We will formalise this in the next section.
3 Preliminaries
In this section we lay out some definitions for use throughout the rest of this
paper. We will only be interested in discrete sets so we present a simplified
formalisation, noting that the definition also applied to continuous sets and
distributions.
Let X and Z be finite sets and let P(Z) be the set of probability measures
over Z. We define a mechanism as a probabilistic function K : X → P(Z)
Recall that a metric d : X × X → [0,∞) satisfies (i) d(x, y) = 0 iff x = y,
(ii) d(x, y) = d(y, x) and (iii) d(x, y) + d(y, z) ≥ d(x, z) for all x, y, z ∈ X . We
denote by d2 the Euclidean metric on R
n.
We recall the definition of generalised differential privacy:
4Definition 1. (Generalised Differential Privacy) Let ǫ > 0. A mechanism K :
X → P(Z) satisfies dX -privacy, iff ∀x, x′ ∈ X :
K(x)(Z) ≤ eǫdX (x,x′)K(x′)(Z) ∀Z ⊆ Z 3
We now formalise some notions from the natural language processing litera-
ture.
Let V be a fixed finite vocabulary of words from all possible documents. A
bag of words (BOW) is an unordered, finite-length lists of words from V with
duplicates permitted. A document vector is an ordered bag of words. A word
embedding vector is a k-dimensional real-valued vector representing a word in V ,
for some fixed positive integer k. We assume the existence of a word embedding
vector lookup table, denoted W , such that W (w) returns the word embedding
vector for the word w ∈ V .
We denote by W the universe of word embedding vectors (for all words in
V). We denote by U(W) the set of unordered lists of word vectors, also known
as BOWs, and by O(W) the set of ordered lists of word vectors, also known as
document vectors.
We note that we can transform a BOW into a document vector by fixing an
(arbitrary) ordering of words.
The Word Mover’s Distance can be formally defined as follows:
Definition 2. (Word Mover’s Distance) Let x, y ∈ O(W) be document vectors
of lengths a and b respectively. We assume the existence of a non-negative, real-
valued cost function over V. Let C ∈ Ra×b be a cost matrix, where Cij represents
the cost of moving word i in x to word j in y. Define T ∈ Ra×b to be a flow
matrix where the entry Tij denotes how much of word i in x moves to word j
in y. Then the Word Mover’s Distance dW (x, y) is defined as the solution to the
linear optimisation problem:
dW (x, y) = min
T≥0
∑
i,j
TijCij
subject to: ∑
j
Tij =
1
a
∀i ∈ [1 . . . a]
and ∑
i
Tij =
1
b
∀j ∈ [1 . . . b]
We also define our notion of document privacy under the term document-
indistinguishability.
Definition 3. (Document-Indistinguishability) Let dW : U(W)×U(W)→ [0,∞)
be the Word Mover’s Distance defined on BOW documents. A mechanism K :
U(W) → P(U(W)) satisfies ǫ-document-indistinguishability iff for all x, x′ ∈
U(W) :
K(x)(Z) ≤ eǫdW (x,x′)K(x′)(Z) ∀Z ⊆ U(W)
3 We make the simplifying assumption that all sets in Z are measurable.
54 Privacy Using the Word Mover’s Distance
We now present some results on the Word Mover’s Distance which will allow us
to produce a differentially private mechanism for documents.
4.1 Optimal Solution to the Word Mover’s Distance
Our first result shows that an optimal solution to the Word Mover’s Distance
problem involves the movement of whole words only, precisely when the source
and destination documents are the same length. In order to prove this result, we
first introduce some results on doubly stochastic matrices.
Definition 4. An n × n matrix whose elements are non-negative and has all
rows and columns summing to 1 is called doubly stochastic. A doubly stochastic
matrix which contains only 1’s and 0’s is called a permutation matrix.
Theorem 1. (Birkhoff-von Neumann) The set of n×n doubly stochastic matri-
ces forms a convex polytope whose vertices are the n× n permutation matrices.
The Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem says that the set of doubly stochastic
matrices is a closed, bounded convex set, and every doubly stochastic matrix
can be written as a convex combination of the permutation matrices. We can
use this theorem to prove the following result.
Theorem 2. Let C be an n × n cost matrix. Then the optimisation problem
minimise
∑
i,j
TijCij where T is an n× n doubly stochastic matrix always has an
n× n permutation matrix as an optimal solution.
We are now ready to present a result on the Word Mover’s Distance, namely
that documents of equal length always have an optimal solution which does
not involve partial movements of words. We note that the order of words in a
document does not affect the calculation of the Word Mover’s Distance, hence
the following result on document vectors also holds for BOW documents.
Theorem 3. Let d1, d2 ∈ O(W) be n-dimensional document vectors. Then the
Word Mover’s Distance dW (d1, d2) has an optimal solution involving only the
movement of whole words.
Proof. Since d1 and d2 are both of length n, the flow matrix T must be n × n
so we can rewrite the constraints as
∑
i
Tij =
1
n
∀j ∈ [1 . . . n] and
∑
j
Tij =
1
n
∀i ∈ [1 . . . n]
Notice that the optimisation problem is in essence unchanged if we multiply T
by a constant, so we could also write
∑
i
Tij = 1 ∀j ∈ [1 . . . n] and
∑
j
Tij = 1 ∀i ∈ [1 . . . n]
6Thus we have a T that is doubly stochastic. From Theorem 2 the optimal
solution includes a permutation matrix, that is, a matrix in which there is ex-
actly one 1 in each row and column and the remaining elements are 0. But this
corresponds to a flow where each word in d1 moves entirely to a whole word in
d2. This completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Example We will use a simple example to demonstrate how the flow matrix
can be simplified when both documents are of the same length. Consider the
documents d = ‘Obama speaks Illinois’ and d′ = ‘President greets press’. The
relative mass of each word in each document is 13 since both documents are the
same length; this is depicted by the vectors dp and d
′
p
in Figure 3. We imagine
a cost matrix such that the flow matrix T given in Figure 1 is optimal. Now,
consider the scenario in Figure 2 where the relative mass of each word is 1. Since
we have simply multiplied the relative weights of all words by 3 without changing
the cost matrix, the optimal solution matrix T ′ will correspond exactly to 3T ,
and becomes doubly stochastic. Although the computed distance will also be 3
times the original distance, the relative flow between words in the 2 documents
is preserved. In particular, whole word flows in Figure 1 correspond with whole
word flows in Figure 2. Thus the result of Theorem 3 stands in both cases.
1
3
1
3
1
3
dp =
1
3
1
3
1
3
d
′
p =
0 1
3
0
1
3
0 0
0 0 1
3
T =
Fig. 1: Sample vectors and flow
matrix T for standard Word
Mover’s Distance formulation.
1 1 1dp =
1 1 1d
′
p =
0 1 0
1 0 0
0 0 1
T’ =
Fig. 2:Modified vectors using mul-
tiplicative factor of 3 to produce
doubly stochastic flow matrix T ′.
Fig. 3: Example of modifying the Word Mover’s Distance problem to generate a doubly
stochastic flow matrix. Multiplying the relative word weights by a constant corresponds
to multiplication of the flow matrix by the same constant, however the relative flows
between words remains unchanged.
74.2 Extension to Document-Indistinguishability
We are now ready to present our main theorem, which provides a connection
between generalised differential privacy for vectors and document indistinguisha-
bility.
Theorem 4. Let K : Rk → P(Rk) be a mechanism operating on real-valued
k-dimensional vectors which satisfies ǫd2-privacy. Then K can be extended to
a mechanism K∗ : U(W) → P(U(W)) operating on documents which satisfies
ǫ-document-indistinguishability.
Proof Sketch Firstly, we can think of K as a mechanism operating on doc-
ument (ordered) vectors, and show that it can be extended to a mechanism
operating on BOW documents (unordered vectors) by considering the appro-
priate permutations. It turns out that we can fix any ordering of words in the
source document and just consider permutations of the output document. This
means the privacy guarantee for input documents x, x′ is determined by any
ordering we choose. We can therefore choose an ordering which minimises the
transportation cost between corresponding words in the documents, which, from
Theorem 3, corresponds to the WMD.
5 Privacy Mechanism
We are now ready to present a privacy mechanism for document-indistinguishability.
We have seen that to find a mechanism satisfying ǫ-document-indistinguishability,
it suffices to find a mechanism operating on vectors which satisfies ǫd2-privacy.
Previous work [1] has shown how this can be done in 2-dimensions via the planar
Laplacian. We now present an extension of this result to n-dimensions.
5.1 n-Dimensional Laplace Mechanism
Given sets X ,Z of n-dimensional vectors, we would like a mechanism K with
pdf D satisfying
D(x)(z) ∝ e−ǫd2(x,z) for x ∈ X , z ∈ Z
Such a mechanism is called a Laplace mechanism and satisfies ǫd2-privacy [2].
We require a method of selecting a vector according to this distribution.
Noting that D is spherically symmetric, and using translation invariance,
we can consider the distribution D(0)(z) and translate this by x to get the
distribution D(x)(z). For notational convenience we write D(0)(z) as D0(z).
Using z = (z1, z2, . . . , zn) then D0(z) can be rewritten as
D0(z) = ce
−ǫ
√
z2
1
+z2
2
+...+z2n
8Calculating the constant c can be done by a mapping (z1, z2, . . . , zn) 7→
(r, θ1, θ2, . . . , θn−1) to spherical co-ordinates. This yields the following integral
∞∫
0
c1r
n−1e−ǫrdr
π∫
0
c2 sin
n−2 θ1dθ1
π∫
0
c3 sin
n−3 θ2dθ2· · ·
π∫
0
cn−1 sin θn−2dθn−2
2π∫
0
cndθn−1
where
n∏
k=1
ck = c.
This is a product of independent distributions, and in particular, the constant
c1 in the first integral can be shown to evaluate to
ǫn
(n−1)! yielding
∞∫
0
ǫn
(n− 1)!r
n−1e−ǫrdr =
∞∫
0
ǫn
Γ (n)
rn−1e−ǫrdr
which we recognise as the PDF of the Gamma distribution
f(x, k; θ) =
1
Γ (k)θk
xk−1e−
x
θ
where x 7→ r, k 7→ n and θ 7→ 1
ǫ
.
The remaining product of integrals is equivalent to selecting an n-dimensional
vector uniformly over the unit n-sphere. Therefore, the selection of a random
n-dimensional Laplace vector can be achieved by selecting a random vector uni-
formly over the surface of an n-sphere and applying a scaling factor drawn from
the gamma distribution. We formalise this as follows
Theorem 5. Let US1 be the uniform distribution on the n-dimensional sphere
of radius 1, and denote by Gamma(k, θ) the Gamma distribution with shape k
and scale θ. Let K : Rn → P(Rn) be a mechanism operating on real-valued
n-dimensional vectors which outputs z with distribution x + UR, where U ∼
US1 and R ∼ Gamma(n, 1ǫ ). Then the mechanism K is a Laplace mechanism
satisfying ǫd2-privacy.
Note that choosing n=2 results in the planar Laplacian described in [1].
Several methods have been proposed for the generation of random variables
from the Gamma distribution [3] as well as the uniform selection of points on
the unit n-sphere [4]. We will not present methods for the former, as there are
already implementations in libraries such as Scipy (for Python) for selecting
from the Gamma distribution. However, there is a nice method for selecting a
random vector from the surface of the unit n-sphere which has been described
previously in the literature [4]. The method is to select n random variables from
the Gaussian distribution over [0, 1] into an n-dimensional vector v and output
the normalised vector v|v| . This method allows a random unit n-vector to be
drawn without requiring a transformation from polar co-ordinates.
95.2 Mechanism for Document Indistinguishability
We now present a mechanism satisfying ǫ-indistinguishability. We assume that
input documents have first been converted into a bag of words with stopwords
discarded. We then use the method for generating fixed-length documents de-
scribed in [6]. That is, the bag of words document can be used to generate a
distribution over words using the frequency count of each word in the docu-
ment. A fixed-length document can be generating by selecting n words from the
document according to the distribution. These preprocessing steps d
This is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Obfuscation Mechanism
Require: epsilon ǫ, word embeddings W , documents d
for doc in d do
words = list words in doc
for w in words do
x = lookup vector for w in W
r = select scale according to Gamma(dim(x), 1
ǫ
)
u = select unit vector uniformly on dim(x)-sphere
z = x + ru
z’ = lookup closest word to z in W
add z’ to noisy doc
end for
add noisy doc to obfuscated dataset
end for
return obfuscated dataset
Theorem 6. The mechanism presented in Algorithm 1 satisfies ǫ-document-
indistinguishability.
Proof. The inner loop contains the Laplace mechanism as described in Theo-
rem 5, which satisfies ǫd2-privacy. The ’closest word’ step represents a post-
processing truncation of the vector z, which does not change the ǫd2-privacy
guarantee of the inner loop. The outer loop applies mechanism in the inner
loop to every word in the document. By Theorem 4 this outer loop satisfies ǫ-
document-indistinguishability. ⊓⊔
A Proofs Omitted from Section 4
Theorem 7. Let C be an n × n cost matrix. Then the optimisation problem
minimise
∑
i,j
TijCij where T is an n× n doubly stochastic matrix always has an
n× n permutation matrix as an optimal solution.
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Proof. We prove this by contradiction. Let T ∗ be an optimal n×n solution ma-
trix. We know that such a solution exists by the Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem
(since the set of solutions is closed and bounded). We assume firstly that T ∗ is
not a permutation matrix, and secondly that no permutation matrix is optimal.
Let {P 1, P 2, . . . , P k} be the set of n × n permutation matrices. Then, by the
Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem, we can write
T ∗ = λ1P
1 + λ2P
2 + . . .+ λkP
k (1)
where λi ≥ 0 and
k∑
i=1
λi = 1. Since T
∗ is optimal and none of the P i are optimal,
we can also write
∑
i,j
Pmij Cij >
∑
i,j
T ∗ijCij (by assumption)
for 0 < m ≤ k. And thus we have
∑
i,j
T ∗ijCij =
∑
i,j
(λ1P
1
ij + . . .+ λkP
k
ij)Cij (from 1)
=
∑
i,j
λ1P
1
ijCij + . . .+
∑
i,j
λkP
k
ijCij (factorising)
>
∑
i,j
λ1T
∗
ijCij + . . .+
∑
i,j
λkT
∗
ijCij (by assumption)
= λ1
∑
i,j
T ∗ijCij + . . .+ λk
∑
i,j
T ∗ijCij (arithmetic)
= (λ1 + . . .+ λk)
∑
i,j
T ∗ijCij (factorising)
=
∑
i,j
T ∗ijCij (since
k∑
i=1
λi = 1)
which is a contradiction. Thus, either T ∗ is a permutation matrix, or there must
be a permutation matrix which is also optimal.
The following lemma is useful in proving the next main result on document
indistinguishability.
Lemma 1. Let K : W → P(W) be a mechanism operating on word vectors
and let d, z ∈ U(W) be documents of length n. Then K can be extended to a
mechanism K∗ : U(W)→ P(U(W)) operating on documents such that
K∗(d)(z) =
∑
i
K(w1)(vφi(1))×K(w2)(vφi(2))× . . .×K(wn)(vφi(n))
where the wi, vi are words (arbitrarily labelled) in d, z respectively, the φi are
permutation functions, and the sum is over unique permutations of words in z.
11
Proof. Choose an arbitrary ordering of words in d and z and let d =< w1, w2, . . . , wn >,
z =< v1, v2, . . . , vn > be the corresponding document vectors. Let φi : S → S
be a sequence of permutation functions over S = {1, . . . , n} for i = {1, . . . ,m}
such that < vφi(1), vφi(2), . . . , vφi(n) > is a unique permutation of words in z for
each i.
Now, it is straightforward to extend K to a mechanism K ′ : O(W) →
P(O(W)) operating on document vectors, since we can simply apply K to each
word in order. That is,
K ′(d)(z) = K(w1)(v1)×K(w2)(v2)× . . .×K(wn)(vn)
Clearly, K ′(d) defines a valid probability distribution for any d since we sum
over all possible output vectors z.
In order to extend this to a mechanism over documents, observe that the
mechanism K ′ produces the same output distribution regardless of the ordering
of words in the document vector d (since the mechanism K operates on each
word independently). Therefore we only need to consider permutations of words
in the output document vector z. The distribution over documents is then given
by the sum of distributions over each permutation of words in the output vector
z, that is,
K∗(d)(z) =
∑
i
K(w1)(vφi(1))×K(w2)(vφi(2))× . . .×K(wn)(vφi(n))
Clearly K∗(d) also defines a valid probability distribution, since it produces
the same distribution asK ′(d) except that the output probabilities are ‘collected’
for all permutations of the output vector. ⊓⊔
Theorem 8. Let K : Rk → P(Rk) be a mechanism operating on real-valued
k-dimensional vectors which satisfies ǫd2-privacy. Then K can be extended to
a mechanism K∗ : U(W) → P(U(W)) operating on documents which satisfies
ǫ-document-indistinguishability.
Proof. Since we have a real-valued vector representation for words, we can treat
K as a mechanism operating on word vectors. Let d =< w1, w2, . . . , wn >,
z =< v1, v2, . . . , vn > be n-dimensional document vectors and let φi : S → S
be a sequence of permutation functions over S = {1, . . . , n} for i = {1, . . . ,m}.
From Lemma 1, we can extend K to a mechanism K∗ : U(W) → P(U(W))
satisfying
K∗(d)(z) =
∑
i
K(w1)(vφi(1))×K(w2)(vφi(2))× . . .×K(wn)(vφi(n))
We can choose any particular ordering of words in d since the ordering of
words is arbitrary. Fix any ordering of words in d and let d′ =< w′1, w
′
2, . . . , w
′
n >
be an n-dimensional document vector, where the word order in d′ is chosen to
minimise the sum of the Euclidean distances between corresponding words in d
and d′. That is, we choose an ordering which minimises
n∑
i=1
d2(wi, w
′
i).
12
Now, for the document vectors d, d′, we have that
K∗(d)(z)
K∗(d′)(z)
=
∑
iK(w1)(vφi(1))×K(w2)(vφi(2))× . . .×K(wn)(vφi(n))∑
iK(w
′
1)(vφi(1))×K(w′2)(vφi(2))× . . .×K(w′n)(vφi(n))
=
∑
i
∏
j K(wj)(vφi(j))∑
i
∏
j K(w
′
j)(vφi(j))
(2)
where the number of terms in the numerator and denominator is the same (since
this depends only on z). But we also have that
K(wk)(vφi(k)) ≤ K(w′k)(vφi(k))eǫd2(wk,w
′
k) (ǫd2-privacy) (3)
for all words in d, d′ and all permutations φi. Therefore,
K∗(d)(z)
K∗(d′)(z)
=
∑
i
∏
j K(wj)(vφi(j))∑
i
∏
j K(w
′
j)(vφi(j))
(from 2)
≤
∑
i
∏
j K(w
′
j)(vφi(j))e
ǫd2(wj ,w
′
j)∑
i
∏
j K(w
′
j)(vφi(j))
(from 3)
=
∑
i e
ǫ(d2(w1,w
′
1
)+...+d2(wn,w
′
n))
∏
j K(w
′
j)(vφi(j))∑
i
∏
jK(w
′
j)(vφi(j))
(arithmetic)
=
eǫ(d2(w1,w
′
1
)+...+d2(wn,w
′
n))
∑
i
∏
j K(w
′
j)(vφi(j))∑
i
∏
jK(w
′
j)(vφi(j))
(arithmetic)
= eǫ(d2(w1,w
′
1
)+...+d2(wn,w
′
n)) (cancelling like terms) (4)
Now, notice that the documents d and d′ have the same dimension (necessar-
ily, due to the operation of the mechanism K∗). Therefore we know from Theo-
rem 3 that the Word Mover’s Distance dW(d,d
′) has an optimal solution involv-
ing the movement of whole words. That is, there exists a permutation of words
< w′φi(1), w
′
φi(2)
, . . . , w′φi(n) > in d
′ such that dW(d,d
′) =
∑
k
d2(wk, w
′
φi(k)
). But
we chose an ordering of words in d′ that minimises
∑
k
d2(wk, w
′
k). Recalling that
the Word Mover’s Distance is minimal, we therefore must have that
dW(d,d
′) =
∑
k
d2(wk, w
′
k)
And so,
K∗(d)(z)
K∗(d′)(z)
≤ eǫ(d2(w1,w′1)+...+d2(wn,w′n)) (from 4)
= eǫdW (d,d
′)
Thus the mechanism K∗ satisfies ǫ-document-indistinguishability. ⊓⊔
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B Proofs Omitted from Section 5
We present here a more complete proof of the derivation of the n-dimensional
Laplace mechanism.
We consider the distribution D0(z) = ce
−ǫ
√
z2
1
+z2
2
+...+z2n for some constant c.
In order to select a point from this distribution, we consider the CDF
F (z) =
∫
· · ·
∫
ZA
ce−ǫ
√
z2
1
+z2
2
+...+z2n dz1 . . . dzn (5)
for some region of interest ZA.
To compute this we require a change of co-ordinates. We can convert from
Cartesian co-ordinates to spherical co-ordinates
(z1, z2, z3, . . . , zn) 7→ (r, θ1, θ2, . . . , θn−1)
as stated in [5] using a transformation r =
√
z21 + z
2
2 + . . .+ z
2
n with inverse
z1 = r cos θ1
z2 = r sin θ1 cos θ2
z3 = r sin θ1 sin θ2 cos θ3
. . .
zn−1 = r sin θ1 sin θ2 . . . sin θn−2 cos θn−1
zn = r sin θ1 sin θ2 . . . sin θn−2 sin θn−1
We also need to calculate the matrix of partial derivatives to get the Jacobian,
which is well known to be
∂(z1, z2, . . . , zn)
∂(r, θ1, . . . , θn−1)
= rn−1 sinn−2 θ1 sin
n−3 θ2 . . . sin
2 θn−3 sin θn−2
And therefore the integral in (5) becomes
∫
· · ·
∫
ZA
ce−ǫ
√
z2
1
+z2
2
+...+z2n dz1 . . . dzn
=
∫
· · ·
∫
ZA
ce−ǫrrn−1 sinn−2 θ1 sin
n−3 θ2 . . . sin
2 θn−3 sin θn−2drdθ1 . . . dθn−1
=
R∫
0
c1r
n−1e−ǫrdr
π∫
0
c2 sin
n−2 θ1dθ1
π∫
0
c3 sin
n−3 θ2dθ2· · ·
π∫
0
cn−1 sin θn−2dθn−2
2π∫
0
cndθn−1
where
n∏
k=1
ck = c.
14
We note that this is a product of independent distributions, and thus the
co-ordinates (radius and angles) can be selected independently. We also require
that each integral sums to 1 to get valid probability distributions, so firstly we
can calculate the constant c1 using
∞∫
0
c1r
n−1e−ǫrdr = 1 (6)
Using integration by parts we find
∞∫
0
c1r
n−1e−ǫrdr =
c1
ǫn
(n− 1)!
And thus the integral in (6) becomes
∞∫
0
ǫn
(n− 1)!r
n−1e−ǫrdr =
∞∫
0
ǫn
Γ (n)
rn−1e−ǫrdr
which we recognise as the PDF of the Gamma distribution
f(x, k; θ) =
1
Γ (k)θk
xk−1e−
x
θ
where x 7→ r, k 7→ n and θ 7→ 1
ǫ
.
Now, we also note that the remaining integrals (over the angles θ1, . . . θn−1)
correspond to the Jacobian for the unit n-sphere. In other words, this is equiva-
lent to the problem of selecting a point uniformly over the surface of the n-sphere.
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